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CIA'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FIELD OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE

Psychological warfare, as contradistinguished from a foreign information and cultural relations program, is an arm of national foreign policy that is employed only when normal political relations between states have greatly deteriorated and governments have reached the point of trying to undermine the faith of a foreign people in its government. Psychological warfare may, of course, be waged either without accompanying military action or in conjunction with it; and, like military action, psychological warfare has as its ultimate goal a radical change in the political situation.

For waging psychological warfare, however, all kinds of intelligence are needed, and political intelligence is not always even the most important of these kinds. Indeed, for the countries now opposed to the US (or likely to be overrun with Communist armies), ordinary political intelligence may often be one of the less important requisites, since it is the nature of Communist states to suppress all other political parties and abolish or make meaningless the normal political processes both of Western democracies and of the Latin American type of dictatorship. In other words, the varied emotional tensions which psychological warfare seeks to exploit are in these countries largely cut off from what in the West would be their normal political expression.

To locate and analyze these points of significant tension in societies unlike our own is a formidable job and -- as World War II experience with regard to Japan indicated -- one requiring the techniques of the anthropologist or the social psychologist quite as much as those of the political scientist. Such analysis can be performed effectively only against the background of what might be termed knowledge-in-depth of the social structure of a foreign

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people, their day-to-day habits, what things they particularly prize, what things they are averse to, and how they respond to a great variety of situations, normal and abnormal. Such information, analyzed on a high level of professional competence, is essential both for the preliminary planning as to where the emphases should fall in a psychological warfare program for a given country and in the day-to-day operations of that program.

Psychological warfare itself has already been recognized as a matter of national rather than merely departmental concern, since the actions of the armed services, no less than those of the State Department, unmistakably have direct and immediate implications for psychological warfare. Moreover, if military operations are to have their maximum effectiveness, the psychological repercussions of those operations -- on a precariously balanced non-belligerent as well as on the immediate enemy -- must be taken into account at the planning stage. This is particularly so where unconventional weapons are involved. The Air Force, for example, needs the best possible estimate of the psychological effect of an A-bomb, not merely in the particular target area chosen initially but also in similar areas which may be subsequent targets; the Army, on the other hand, cannot ignore the psychological effects of such a bombing on allied populations living in close proximity to US troops and feeling themselves a probable target for retaliatory Soviet A-bombing; nor can the State Department ignore the repercussions on the public opinions of distant but strategically important countries. Intelligence estimates concerning the psychological responses of foreign peoples to US actions are, therefore, clearly matters of common concern.

To classify such intelligence estimates as matters of common concern, of course, not to say that all of the intelligence going into these estimates

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is a matter of common concern. Part of it is purely political, part of it military, a small part lies in the field of the physical sciences, and so on. To coordinate and focus all this varied intelligence effectively in support of psychological warfare planning and operations, does, however, require a specialized approach which is distinct from that employed in any of the more conventional types of intelligence work. Furthermore, there are some components of these intelligence estimates which go beyond mere coordination of existing intelligence and involve new and extensive research drawing at various points on the resources of the universities of the country as well as on governmental facilities. The very imposing and widely ramified studies of the basic psychological susceptibilities of certain foreign peoples, which have been asked for by two separate parts of the Government, would be one case in point. It is this coordinating function and this supplementary research -- the exact demands for which cannot be accurately predicted in advance -- that would seem to be properly a matter of common intelligence concern in the IAC sense of the term.

The key factor in the problem of psychological intelligence is centralized control -- as distinct from centralized operation -- of the entire intelligence process. The very facts that psychological intelligence makes wide use of data from many fields and that many of these data are of an intangible nature make the worth of the end-product depend, to a far greater extent than in many kinds of intelligence, on careful integration of each of the preceding processes. Beyond this, however, is the need for seeing that the Government's available facilities in this field -- which facilities are currently in short supply -- are used in the most effective way possible. There is presumably no question of CIA's authority to coordinate the intelligence process in this or any other

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field; but that authority cannot in fact be exercised unless CIA is equipped with at least a small group of specialists sufficiently acquainted with the nature of problems in this field to analyze particular intelligence questions with some sophistication and allocate the projects required in full knowledge of the complex considerations involved.

Exactly how such a group should be organized and where it should be placed organizationally in CIA are secondary issues. There would certainly be times at which it would find that existing facilities in the IAC agencies were not able to handle some part of a particular project on a simple allocation basis; and at such times the group would need to supervise the work on that part of the project in a more direct way itself. For this purpose it is essential that the group have access at all times to area specialists -- preferably within CIA -- and be able to call on very substantial amounts of their time where necessary. It is also important that the group have similar access to specialists in the relevant sciences.

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